In so doing, Brawn became the first team since 1978 to win the constructors' crown outside of Ferrari, McLaren, Williams and Benetton/Renault. The secret was a fundamentally perfect mix of aero grip, thanks to the detailed front-end treatment and double-decker diffuser created by the ex-Super Aguri team of aerodynamicists, and mechanical grip under the guidance of Ross Brawn. Incredible reliability played its part too, with only two DNFs (only one of them mechanical) all season.

It was not perfect, however. Jobs had to shed, sponsorship was poor and the Virgin deal was really quite minor, and either a resource or ideas deficiency meant that the problem of insufficient tyre temperatures was never fully addressed. That left the team stumbling, rather than storming, to the ultimate prize. But with a record of one season for two titles, Brawn GP will hold a very special and unbeatable place in the F1 history books, as well as one of the most remarkable stories in the rich tapestry of the sport to go with it.

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Newey could be forgiven for overlooking the double-deck diffuser due to the doubts about its legality, and the fact that the car was faster than all bar Brawn even without that element shows just how brilliant it was. When the double-deck diffuser was finally introduced, coupled to the Silverstone aero update, the RB5 was the fastest car in the field. The problem was, by that stage it did not just have to beat the Brawn, it also had to contend with the likes of a rejuvenated McLaren.

Except for Monza, the team battled for podiums all season, and was the most regularly competitive outfit. It took six wins, only two fewer than Brawn, including a dominant hat-trick in the last three races. But the team did have its failings. The Renault engines had reliability and horsepower issues. At times strategy failed Sebastian Vettel and pit work cost Mark Webber. The team seemed too willing to let mistakes go and lacked clinical killer instinct. A carefree approach is good for marketing, but doesn't win titles.

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Even the initial upgrades McLaren were throwing at the car weren't working. But prior to the German GP, the team took a deep breath, worked out the fundamental flaws of the car, and it was virtually transformed overnight. It still wasn't perfect, but allied to KERS and Hamilton's brilliance, the team won in Hungary and Singapore and was more than competitive at tracks as diverse as Valencia, Monza, Interlagos and Abu Dhabi. Given their early-season form, the extent of the turnaround was truly astonishing.

It also gave the team incredible confidence and momentum leading into 2010. And there was a turnaround off the track as well, as something of a culture change was effected. Ron Dennis had already handed the reins to the more humane Martin Whitmarsh before the season began, but he departed more permanently along with Dave Ryan after the disappointing Lie-gate affair, which also served to improve Hamilton's character for the better. The team was unable to get the best out of Heikki Kovalainen, however.

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But instead of getting dispirited, the Force India crew chipped away at their goal of becoming regular points scorers, with no let-up in development and several significant upgrade packages, notably at Silverstone and Valencia. The result was what would have been the feel-good story of the year had it not been for Brawn's emergence, with Giancarlo Fisichella's pole and should-have-been win at Spa and Adrian Sutil's front-row start and should-have-been podium at Monza.

Those results were especially due to the car's ability to produce very little drag, although overall downforce was still lacking. Nevertheless, Sutil also starred at the Nurburgring and in qualifying at Suzuka and Interlagos. So the team didn't quite become consistent points gatherers, but if you told them before the season began that they would break out of Q1 twelve times, and get into Q3 on three occasions, they would have taken that. The way their season went was a most pleasant surprise.

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A big part of that was Kazuki Nakajima's failure to score all season, and his lack of pace which meant that he only made Q3 four times whereas Nico Rosberg only missed it three times. But otherwise there was much to like about what Williams was doing. Yes, it was the only team other than Toro Rosso not to record a podium or a pole, but in Rosberg's hands it was a lot more consistently competitive than all but Brawn and Red Bull, Monza being the only major blip in terms of the team challenging for points.

Development was being kept up, and unlike some recent years, tended to make a positive difference. This was arguably Williams' best year, in terms of regular potential, since 2004 or 2005. Plus, in the midst of the off-track machinations, Williams consistently took the most sensible and apolitical positions. As the manufacturer era started to come to a sudden end, Williams reminded everyone of what it stood for - a no-nonsense independent team getting on with the job, and doing it well.

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For example, the KERS package was not as effective as McLaren's but worth persisting with. The belated double-deck diffuser was unable to fully utilise the concept due to the car's gearbox design. Earlier than just about everyone, Ferrari chose not to further develop the F60, practically writing off the year by mid-season or even earlier. Operationally, the team also made some unusual errors, such as the Q1 eliminations in Malaysia and Spain, and choice of monsoon tyres for a light shower at Sepang.

In addition, the team's best performances, at Monaco, Hungary, Spa and Monza, were on atypical tracks or were KERS-assisted. Kimi Raikkonen and Felipe Massa also flattered the car, as the tribulations of Luca Badoer and Giancarlo Fisichella proved. As a result, despite coming 4th in the constructors' title, we never knew if Ferrari fully understood current design concepts, especially in the absence of KERS which will not be used next year, or how to develop this style of car throughout a season. That spells uncertainty for 2010.

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But did Toyota get the fundamentals correct because it understood the regulations, or by chance? The car was wildly unpredictable; the team locked out the front row in Bahrain, but two races later was eliminated in Q1 at Monaco. That fluctuation even showed on single race weekends; Timo Glock scored fastest lap at Valencia having started 14th and finished 13th. Development parts were often discarded because they didn't fit well with the overall package, but late in the season it was fast again in the flyaway rounds.

Throw in the cock-up of running prime tyres in the middle stint in Bahrain, which was the most damning example of Toyota's strategic deficiencies, and you have a team that is so muddled in its approach, so lacking in clear-sightedness and technical direction, that it's no surprise that it hasn't won anything. But that is nothing new - that has been the story for the past eight years. The irony is that head office pulled the plug wondering why the approach didn't work, instead of realising that the approach was all wrong to begin with.

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How miserably wrong that assumption was. KERS was not as determinative a factor as aerodynamics. The F1.09's package not only gave the Renault R29 a run for its money in the ugly duckling stakes, but it was also basic and ineffective. Front wing endplates were so crucial, and yet BMW's were neanderthal compared to others. The bulky KERS components, which were dumped early on anyway, only exacerbated the inefficiency of the airflow around the car, especially around the sidepods.

The situation so dispirited Robert Kubica that the team rarely got the best out of him all season. There was a late-season upsurge - the double top-five grid and finishing positions at Spa and Kubica's 2nd at Brazil being the highlights - but it was too late for BMW to start getting the aerodynamics right. And by this stage, BMW had already pulled the pin on its F1 efforts, having been rudely awoken to the fact that the best-laid plans and strategic timelines can oft go awry.

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Moreover, Adrian Newey was focussed on the senior team, and not on Toro Rosso's requirements with its Ferrari motor. STR, on the other hand, did not have the financial or technical resources in the factory to develop and finetune in the absence of in-season testing. Dietrich Mateschitz's statements about selling up added instability and diverted attention, whilst the driving force was unable to direct the team technically either, or to regularly maximise the team's potential.

On that front, STR erred in promoting Sebastien Buemi early from the junior program to replace Sebastian Vettel, and so retained Sebastien Bourdais over signing Takuma Sato in the name of stability. Whilst Buemi impressed, he was a rookie who became team leader when the even greener Jaime Alguersuari replaced Bourdais. So much for stability. It was the sight-impaired leading the blind. The overall result was 13 retirements, six caused by accidents, and nothing near replicating the team's 2008 achievements.

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The car was a lower-end points scorer at best even in Fernando Alonso's hands, resulting in low fuel strategies to get the Spaniard early track position which were rarely optimal. Neither Nelson Piquet, Jr. or Romain Grosjean proved good enough to be truly competitive, and so Renault often opted for the other extreme in terms of strategy for the second car - loading it up with fuel at the start - which only added to Piquet and Grosjean's anonymity. One solitary pole and podium and 26 points was a meagre return.

Perhaps Flavio Briatore got too caught up on FOTA matters, which ultimately bit him hard personally and hurt the team. By the end of the season he and Pat Symonds were gone, most of the sponsors had fled, Alonso was off to greener pastures, and the team had suffered the ignominy of the Crashgate scandal on top of the original ban that it was due to face in Valencia. The Renault boardroom was even selling a stake in the team to Genii Capital just to continue in the sport. Time to start over from scratch.

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