All of them were pressured into forgetting the golden rule of this year’s regulations - that you have to plan your race backwards from where you want to be in the final stint in terms of tyre performance especially, and you don’t want to be lured into impulsive skirmishes that make you lose sight of that end goal too much. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened. It could have been so different, especially when Mark Webber had ended Vettel’s pole streak thanks to a great lap and KERS trouble for the German.

The run down to the first corner looked like an action replay of 2010. Vettel tried to tuck into Webber’s slipstream whilst the Aussie defended the inside line, before darting to the outside. But behind them, Fernando Alonso did what Lewis Hamilton didn’t dare in 2010 - from 4th on the grid after a breathtaking Q3 lap, he fired his Ferrari inside Webber and made it stick. Spooked by the local hero’s chutzpah, Mark braked a touch early, and not only conceded the lead but relinquished 2nd to his team-mate as well.

But Vettel was nevertheless behind the Ferrari, and it soon became apparent that the DRS was of little use. Now put yourself in Sebastian’s cockpit. You know that the three races you’ve won this year have been by leading from the front, and pulling out a gap that gives you a strategic comfort zone. The only one you’ve lost is when you didn’t lead early. So what do you do? You want to get to the front and get clear track as soon as possible. How? By undercutting Alonso quickly. It was a no-brainer.

And so he tried - remarkably early, really - at the end of lap 9. It didn’t work, because he landed behind Vitaly Petrov, the Mercedes, Felipe Massa and the slow-starting Jenson Button. Although he scythed past Button, Massa and Nico Rosberg with impressive assertiveness, the damage had been done. Alonso responded on the following lap, and stayed ahead. If at first you don’t succeed, try again; Vettel did, on lap 18. This time he emerged in clean air, and got the undercut done. Effectively he was in the clear.

But here’s the point that anyone with an abacus could have noticed. This was lap 19 out of 66, and Vettel was already onto his last set of options. People had reckoned that this would be a three-stop race, maybe even two-stop. The options could last around 14 or 15 laps. On an ideal strategy, if you ran your three sets of options first, that would mean making a third stop around lap 45, and then using a set of primes for the last 20 laps or so, which was pretty much exactly what the primes were good for.

Vettel now had track position but in reality he was paying a high price. He was consigning himself to a third stop around lap 32 to 34 (he ended up stopping after 34). If he had set out to do the race on three-stops, that meant running one set of primes for half the race - mission impossible. So he had to four-stop, with two stints on the much slower primes. It made sense for him to get track position, but he was running a grave risk of peaking too early, and having to conserve to the finish.

But if it made sense for Vettel to deploy such a strategy, did it make sense for Alonso, Webber and Hamilton to do the same? First time around it was understandable that they tried to block Vettel’s move, but it was clear that Alonso only succeeded in doing so because Sebastian had not had a clear out-lap. Webber had in fact been burnt by following suit; Hamilton had stopped later and leapfrogged him, to prove that that could actually be done. Mark was now on his newest set of options.

More importantly, they had all had a foretaste of Vettel’s intentions. Second time around, when the fastest man in the fastest car on fresh tyres was in clean air, there was only going to be one outcome. As the saying goes, “Shame on you if you fool me once; shame on me if you fool me twice.” There was no point following suit. They couldn’t stop Sebastian hitting the front. And it would have just left them in the same strategic dilemma that Vettel was going to find himself in later in the race.

For Webber, it was actually quadruply stupid. Not only because he couldn’t stop Vettel and he was now forcing himself onto a four-stop strategy as well, but he had also just lost five or six laps on his best set of tyres, and by pitting at the same time as Alonso he was destined to stay behind the Ferrari for yet another stint. What rubbish to say Ferrari covered their moves each time. His crew could see the team in red getting ready. Webber could see Alonso go in first. They could collectively have chosen not to come in.

Surely, such was the Red Bull’s pace advantage that there was every chance a clear lap on older tyres would still leapfrog him above the Spaniard. It was a gamble worth taking. Having failed to take that punt at the second stop, surely he had to at the third stop, with Alonso switching onto primes - which, as it turned out, he would struggle massively on. But no; Webber followed the Ferrari in again! It was tactical suicide, and it showed when he was still stuck behind Fernando, and both watched Button on options blast past.

Only at the fourth stop did Webber pit eight laps later than Fernando, and he easily got ahead of the Ferrari, but it was all too late. The podium was gone. It was horrendous strategy on the part of the Australian and his engineers, which meant that Mark never had a meaningful chance to exploit his car’s pace. Following-suit tactics were wrong at every turn, and especially wrong in 2011 when you have to be focussed on your own strategy with the end game in mind.

Having started from pole and being a Barcelona specialist, to finish off the podium was a disaster for Webber, points-wise and psychologically, but it was simply down to several avoidably poor tactical calls. "Reject of the Race" thus goes to Mark Webber’s strategy. It’s really a joint award to all those calling the shots, who are saved from being named and shamed because we don’t know exactly who made the decisions, although Webber, his engineer Ciaran Pilbeam and perhaps even Christian Horner all had a say in it.

What of Hamilton, then? At the second stops, he didn’t immediately join the pit party. Released from behind Alonso, he tried to make hay, but instead of going all the way with an alternative strategy, he also blinked and gave in to a four-stopper as well, and inevitably conceded the lead. For the rest of the afternoon, he did what Lewis does best - drive the wheels off his car and extract the absolute maximum out of it. In doing so he managed to put massive pressure on Vettel for the rest of the race.

It was thrilling to watch as the McLaren drew closer, but with Sebastian getting great drive out of the last corner, and the DRS having very little effect, Hamilton was never likely to get past. Still, it was fantastic pressure motor racing, and all credit to Vettel as well. He had pace he couldn’t utilise because of his strategic compromise and KERS problems, but he perfected the things he had to get right each lap - clean acceleration out of the last corner, hitting his braking mark for turn one, no mistakes elsewhere.

Ultimately, though, it was immensely frustrating that each of Hamilton, Alonso and Webber fell for Vettel’s tricks and went four-stop. I’m not saying that they would necessarily have beaten Sebastian had they perhaps stuck or gone to a three-stopper, seeing that Vettel would be out of options by half distance. But at least they would have given themselves a chance. By each doing what they did, they merely doomed themselves to defeat. There was no way they would beat Vettel at his own game.

Alonso paid a particularly heavy penalty for having to run more than half the race on primes on which he was embarrassingly slow; he was lapped by the end of the afternoon. For me, Button was a hero of the race for having the fortitude to stick to his guns. Perhaps that was because his poor start meant he wasn’t in the lead battle, and so he didn’t get caught up responding to Vettel. But the Mercedes, Massa and Petrov had all stopped by lap 11; Jenson did not come in until lap 14.

As it turned out, Jenson’s rivals were all three-stopping as well, but with their early first stops they could have gone either way. Button stayed on plan, believed in the inherent pace of the McLaren, and leapfrogged all his opponents despite an extra three laps on old rubber. He was never troubled by the Mercedes again, and instead found Alonso and Webber coming back to him by mid-race. This was exactly what keeping the end goal in mind was all about. What could Webber or Hamilton have done on a three-stop?

All the strategic machinations meant no-one showed their true pace on Sunday. Red Bull had a massive advantage in qualifying, but Barcelona plays to their strengths more than other tracks. On the other hand, the McLaren is probably not as close as Hamilton would have suggested. But of the three leading teams, Ferrari were the most disappointing. Their qualifying pace is still average, but here their race pace, especially on the new Pirelli primes, was particularly poor.

Before I move onto the rest of the field, two general points need to be made. The first is that the DRS not only did not work in Barcelona, but amazingly no-one seemed to know that, and in fact people were fearing that the DRS zone was too large, being longer than it had been in each of the previous four events. In fact some teams probably planned their strategies on the assumption that they could use DRS at some stage to move ahead of others.

Surely from now on the teams can’t afford to just guess how well the DRS will work. All they have to do is send both their cars out in free practice on the same fuel load and ask their drivers to carry out a “race battle” simulation, where only the driver behind will open his rear wing. Do that for several laps and the team will have a good idea of how effective the DRS will be, and they can adjust their strategies accordingly. The less useful the DRS is, the less adventurous the tactics ought to be.

The second point is that there has been a lot of deserved criticism so far this season about the television coverage, with the directors for the international feed panned for often not knowing what they should be focussing on. Commentators have also been finding it difficult to keep up with various drivers’ strategies throughout a race. The days when strategy was fairly predictable and easy-to-follow, and when the major moments were obvious even for the inattentive, are no more.

But one thing which has become clear is that the races have often developed into several battle groups. Commentary teams and television production crews should employ three or four people to keep an eye on the various battle groups as they become clear, probably by about one-third distance. They can then best identify when a pass or a pit stop of significance is taking place. Commentary teams could well do with a specific strategy commentator as well as a play-by-play and an expert driving commentator.

Having spilt so much ink on the lead battle, once again I will be brief in covering the rest of the field. The battle between Michael Schumacher, Rosberg, Petrov and Massa for 6th turned out to be exactly one of those distinct battle groups. The silver cars leapfrogged Petrov at the first stops and stayed in 6th and 7th for the rest of the race, Schumacher resolutely refusing to yield to his team-mate having made a bold move around the outside of turn 3 on the first lap.

Michael had to be aggressive on lap one because he was starting 10th. That in turn was because he had not recorded a time in Q3, mainly due to KERS problems, and also because he wanted to save a set of options having wasted a set in Q1. Mercedes’ approach to qualifying once again left a lot to be desired, and placed a great deal of unnecessary pressure on themselves. After such promising speed in Turkey, they languished in Spain compared to the McLarens, let alone the Red Bulls.

Massa tried to do a Vettel and get ahead of his rivals by pitting early for his third and final stop, but that meant having to do 30 laps on a set of primes! It was never going to work, and Felipe had slipped to 10th before he retired. He has now dropped to 8th in the points and this weekend, where he actually needed another run in Q1 to stay alive, was a full second off Alonso in Q3, and was not impressive in the race, did nothing to quieten the doubters and critics who are gathering quickly at the Brazilian’s door.

Joining the battle for 6th at the death was Nick Heidfeld in the other Renault, and in fact given another lap or two he would have probably overtaken the two Mercedes. He ran a reverse three-stop strategy having had to start from the back of the grid, getting his primes out of the way, consolidating mid-race, then coming alive as others went to the primes and he could take advantage of fresh options, slicing through the midfield in his third and fourth stints.

One of the German’s victims turned out to be his team-mate, who could not keep up with the battle and eventually fell out of the points in his stint on the primes. That was a disappointment given Vitaly had started 6th and run 5th early, but at the same time Genii owner Gerard Lopez is unrealistic if he thinks that Petrov and Heidfeld’s podiums in Australia and Malaysia should signal continued dais appearances. Petrov was battling - and Heidfeld eventually got to - where the black and gold cars probably ought to be.

Sauber once again proved to be the best of the genuine midfield runners, Sergio Perez ending up in the top ten for the first time since Melbourne and Kamui Kobayashi scoring yet again. The Mexican did a fine job in particular, having run stints of 7, 22, 18 and 19 laps, with the second stint on the primes. What that says is that the C30’s gentleness on its tyres allows its drivers the option to pit early and undercut rivals, but not run out of rubber later on.

That trait also meant that Kobayashi could recover from his first-lap puncture, his second puncture from as many races as a result of touching another competitor, and essentially two-stop the rest of the race, clawing past the Toro Rossos, Pastor Maldonado and Petrov in a 21-lap final stint on options to secure the last point for 10th. He didn’t have to pass the Force Indias of Paul di Resta and Adrian Sutil on track though; they conceded their places when they pitted.

Force India was another team that employed some unfathomable tactics throughout the weekend. For example, what was the point of sending both cars out on primes in Q2 when Heikki Kovalainen’s Lotus was always likely to go faster on options, relegating them to 16th and 17th on the grid which is the same as where they would have been if they did not go out at all? By venturing out, they were simply wasting tyres and risking car damage for no conceivable gain.

Di Resta was on the fringes of the points for most of the race having made a terrific start. Whereas I have criticised Hamilton, Alonso and Webber for responding too eagerly to Vettel’s lead and deviating too far from optimal race strategy, interestingly di Resta did the opposite. Sometimes, if you are up against rivals on a similar strategy, then responding to a potential undercut isn’t going to take you away from your pre-planned end goal too much, and you are actually better off covering your opponents.

The Scotsman ran a 19-lap third stint on options, leaving only a 14-lap stint on primes at the end. But by pitting seven laps after Kobayashi and four after Perez, he let the Saubers through and that is what cost him a chance of points. He needed to respond to the Swiss cars. Still, di Resta could come away from Spain a lot happier than Sutil. Adrian was out-qualified again, made a poor start, languished all race, and finds himself no longer the spearhead of the team, with his off-track dramas dogging him as well.

The Toro Rossos of Sebastien Buemi and Jaime Alguersuari started 11th and 13th and ran 10th and 11th early, but dropped to an eventual 14th and 16th. It was a function of them both making their first two stops relatively early. Alguersuari was forced into four-stopping whilst Buemi had to stretch out his third stint too long. They lost out to midfield rivals running a more balanced strategy. In other words, the same risk Vettel ought to have exposed himself to, was the risk Toro Rosso ended up suffering.

Likewise, Maldonado did a great job in muscling the Williams into Q3 - who’d have thought that he would beat Rubens Barrichello to that feat? - but having put mileage on all his sets of options, instead of trying to eke more laps out of them he went for a four-stop strategy instead, which was always going to drop him down the field. After his third stop he was in the same vicinity as di Resta, so he may have finished around 12th on a three-stopper, but the extra pit visit meant he fell to 15th.

Barrichello also four-stopped, but that was mainly because he had all these new tyres at his disposal having been eliminated in Q1 with gearbox issues. But the additional stop compared to most of the midfield runners, plus a slow first stop and KERS problems ensured that he made very little progress. The salient lesson here is that just because you have a lot of new sets of tyres doesn’t mean that you have to use them all at the expense of the best possible strategy.

Lotus would have been cock-a-hoop at Kovalainen not only making Q2 but qualifying 15th, but don’t forget that Jarno Trulli also started 18th and the two green cars comfortably held their own in the first stint of the race, at one stage running as high as 8th and 9th even, due to relatively late first stops. But that resulted in them being easily undercut, which happened again at the second stops, leaving the Lotuses trailing again even before Kovalainen’s crash. Progress has clearly been made, though.

Still not much progress at Virgin though, this being the second race in succession where their upgrade package has made little difference. They were still almost a second off the Lotuses, but at least Timo Glock seemed to recover a little of his mojo, out-qualifying Jerome D’Ambrosio and the HRTs. Although he was beaten off the line by Vitantonio Liuzzi, he got back ahead by mid-race and stayed comfortably in front of his Belgian team-mate who had a rather anonymous weekend after his heroics in Turkey.

Indeed, D’Ambrosio was significantly out-qualified by Liuzzi and Narain Karthikeyan, and Liuzzi may well have kept up an engrossing fight with Glock had he not retired with gearbox trouble. Karthikeyan was far less comfortable in the race, quite literally - he had seat problems that burnt his back, as well as a car that was less balanced than Liuzzi’s. Perhaps that explains why Narain found himself being a mobile chicane several times when throughout the year so far he has been exemplary whilst being lapped.