Rejectful Strategy Calls

[ibsey]

Time to name & shame those responsible for poor strategy calls during a GP weekend. It can be a driver like.... Damon Hill demanding slick tyres at the wrong moment in Spa 1995 & 1997 or DC staying out on slicks for way too long on a wet track at Sliverstone 2002.

Or it can be a team like Ferrari deciding to put Kimi Rakkionen out on wet tyres in Malaysia 2009 on a bone dry track...which led to him wrecking his tyres & poping off for an ice cream afterwards (& perhaps consider exchange his Ferrari F1 car for a Citeron Hatchback). Or perhaps even worse Williams' poor set up & tyre choices just prior to Monaco 1997.

Please note this thread is only intended as a bit of fun, not to offend or belittle the efforts of those responsible (which I acknowledge to be incrediably difficult during the pressure of a GP). Actually it would be interesting to know what people's thoughts are on whether Aryton Senna was any good with strategic calls? I am struggling to think of many examples where Aryton excelled in this area (I have a feeling he may have won Detroit 1986 or with good strategy but I can't remember exactly off the top of my head), whereas I can think of a few bad examples for Aryton (Spain 1991 / Mexico 1990 / Spain 1992). So this got me wondering how Aryton would have coped in 1994 in making key strategical decision what with refueling reintroduced?

Particularly when you consider that in 1994 Williams appeared to be slow in picking up on the benefits of understanding the new refueling era strategies (IMO they didn't fully understand them until 1996 i.e. races like Brazil & San Marino). Although having said that it is difficult to know what affect (if any) the aftermath of Imola 1994 had on this particular area. But when you throw into the mix that Aryton & Williams would have been up against M Schumi & Ross Brawn...both of whom would have had significant experience in refueling strategies prior to 1994 from their respective Group C sportcar days & where on top of strategies calls in F1 in 1994. Then one can't help but think perhaps Aryton / Williams would have struggled to beat M Schumi / Benetton on strategy calls alone. Your thoughts on this would be greatly appreicated.

[AdrianSutil]

Lewis Hamilton: Nurburgring 2007.

Race is stopped early due to heavy thunderstorm making evryone and their mothers spin off at turn 1, including Hamilton. Race is re-started behind safety car with the legend that is, Markus Winklehock, leading the race. McLaren decide to put Hamilton on dry tyres on a clearly still-wet track. Hamilton goes off, gets lapped again, finishes less than a second behind Kovalainen... In 9th.

I'm sure to this day that he wouldve won the race had he/the team not gambled on those dry tyres.

[Ferrim]

No offence intended, but it hurts to read "Aryton" so many times.

[tommykl]

Footwork at Monaco in 1996. Are you sure it's a good idea to start on intermediate tyres on such a wet track?

[mario]

Footwork at Monaco in 1996. Are you sure it's a good idea to start on intermediate tyres on such a wet track?

You could add to that the decision by Ferrari to put both of their drivers on intermediate tyres in the 2007 Japanese GP - not only was it illogical given how soaked the track was at the time, it could have also seen both drivers being penalised - or perhaps even disqualified - for ignoring the FIA's mandate for all drivers to start on the full wet tyres when starting behind the safety car.

As for the inverse example, what about Gilles Villeneuve switching from wet to dry weather tyres at Imola in 1981 just before it started raining again? He could have potentially won that race (he was in the lead at the time he pitted), or at least finished high up in the points, but unfortunately misjudged the point at which to switch tyres and paid dearly for it.

[East Londoner]

I think Honda's strategy at the 2007 Monaco Grand Prix was stupid, as both Barrichello and Button had managed to wrestle their crapboxes up the field into the lower half of the top 10, but they hadn't run both compounds of tyres, which, as far as I can remember, they could have easily done so at the previous round of pitstops. Thus, they both had to pit very late in the race, and both finished outside the top 10. Oh dear...

[AdrianSutil]

Footwork at Monaco in 1996. Are you sure it's a good idea to start on intermediate tyres on such a wet track?

Williams 1997 springs to mind. Wet track, dry tyres. I think Villeneuve and Frentzen qualified something like 2nd and 4th and at the end of lap 1, were back in like 9th and 14th. That's a win.

[James1978]

Juan Pablo Montoya at the 2003 USA GP when he was called for a drive-through penalty when it started chucking it down; he came for the penalty BEFORE changing to the right tyres; the rules say you're allowed to go 3 laps before serving the penalty so he could have done it the other way round rather than tip-toeing round on a soaking track on dries........

[Cynon]

Ferrari putting Kimi Raikkonen on wet tires on a dry track, Malaysia 2009 should take the cake easily.

[Stramala]

Hamilton, China, 2007. What is the point in wearing the tyres down to the canvas? How can that possibly the beneficial to overall race time?

[Ferrim]

Ferrari had a more than decent reason to put Räikkönen on wets that day. As it was, they had no chance to score a decent result that day -the car wasn't up to it. He had run out of fuel and the forecast predicted lots of rain coming at any moment. The place being Sepang, when it rains it pours 99% of the time. Hence, if it started rained within the lap after the pitstop, which seemed extremely likely, he would be better off taking full wets at that point. What happened was that, for once, heavy rain took a while to arrive, and so Ferrari got it wrong. But it was a gamble worth taking IMVHO.

Several times this year, Sauber's strategies have proved quite questionable. Staying out when you're losing four seconds a lap isn't the wisest thing to do.

David Coulthard being forced to stay out behind the safety car at the old Hockenheim of all places (2000) was the kind of call that made you think McLaren were biased towards Häkkinen. He was demoted out of the points when he finally pitted, he would have been better off queueing in the pits.

[Wizzie]

Anyone who tried taking on slicks under the first safety car at the 2005 Belgian Grand Prix. It was just far too early to even consider slicks at that stage of the race (Indeed, it only got ready for slick 20 laps later).

Toyota at the 2009 Bahrain Grand Prix. Seriously guys, if you're 1-2 in the race, the last thing you should do is try and experiment with strategy. ESPECIALLY when you don't have the inherent pace to make it work

[tommykl]

Anyone who tried taking on slicks under the first safety car at the 2005 Belgian Grand Prix. It was just far too early to even consider slicks at that stage of the race (Indeed, it only got ready for slick 20 laps later).

I seem to remember that the pitlane was so filled that Villeneuve was in second place at some point.

[ibsey]

Simliar to the Gilles / Imola 1981 example (IMO one of my all time favourite drives from Gilles, which highlighted his 'never give up approach' particularly after that poor strategy call) was Senna at Spa 1992, where IIRC, he stayed out on slicks when most of the field pitted for the correct wet tyres. In itself that wasn't so bad, since the track was drying out (abiet slowly). However what made it worse was Senna gave up on his gamble & pitted for wets, when others were starting to think about slicks. Had Senna stayed on his orginal slicks, who knows what could have happened?

Also can vaguely remember an awful strategy call from I think Jenson Button & BAR in the 2004 US GP, where when the safety car came out for R Schumi's accident, everyone & his mother decided to pit. However BAR decided to get track position with JB, dithered for 5 laps or so, then decided to pit after all, thus ending up at the back of the field in a race I think they could have done well.

[ibsey]

No offence intended, but it hurts to read "Aryton" so many times.

Don't worry, none taken. Just learnt the correct spelling...what I fool I feel.

[ibsey]

Just remembered another one. Damon Hill opted for a semi dry set up in Barcelona 1996, when it seemed clear to everyone else, that the whole race was going to be VERY wet. I mean there is gambling & then there is commiting suicide.

[Wizzie]

Also can vaguely remember an awful strategy call from I think Jenson Button & BAR in the 2004 US GP, where when the safety car came out for R Schumi's accident, everyone & his mother decided to pit. However BAR decided to get track position with JB, dithered for 5 laps or so, then decided to pit after all, thus ending up at the back of the field in a race I think they could have done well.

And the icing on the cake they didn't get the track position as Michael had gotten ahead of both of them anyway

[JeremyMcClean]

I thought Bruno Senna's strategist at the Korean (?) GP in 2011 was stupid. He was in the points, but pitted with a handful of laps to go for hards. Stupid and idiotic! Not sure if that's what Senna Jr wanted or if he was forced to, but I thought Bruno had the pace to score points that day.

Then again, Renault/Lotus was doing some strange things near the end of the season...

[Klon]

I thought Bruno Senna's strategist at the Korean (?) GP in 2011 was stupid. He was in the points, but pitted with a handful of laps to go for hards. Stupid and idiotic! Not sure if that's what Senna Jr wanted or if he was forced to, but I thought Bruno had the pace to score points that day.

Wasn't he falling afoul of the "each set per GP" rule and had to pit, lest he would be facing a DSQ?

[Shizuka]

Barrichello @ 2007 Montreal before the last safety car came in?
He was third, IIRC, he pitted just when the SC came in, finished dead last...

[Wizzie]

Barrichello @ 2007 Montreal before the last safety car came in?
He was third, IIRC, he pitted just when the SC came in, finished dead last...

That was more Honda incompetence than anything else.

They stuffed up with both cars the previous race at Monaco as well by switching them to half-three quarter strategies rather than keeping them on one-stoppers which could have sneaked them home a point or two by the end.

[mario]

Barrichello @ 2007 Montreal before the last safety car came in?
He was third, IIRC, he pitted just when the SC came in, finished dead last...

That was during the period when the FIA would close the pit lane during the safety car period, so pitting during a safety car period (unless the FIA had re-opened the pit lane) would immediately lead to a 10 second stop-go penalty. It was also awkward because there were two back to back safety car periods happening within a lap of each other; had Rubens pitted during one of those safety car periods, he'd have been at the back anyway because of the stop-go penalty.

[David AGS]

Not a real rejectful call, but more of a lottery.

Spa 2008. Sebastien Bourdais. Running in third, did not bit to change to inters, if he had would most likely would have kept that 3rd place, he didnt, and was passed by several others on the inters and dropped to seventh.

I guess they still had a good result with a points finish, but could have been much much better and possibly career changing too.

[QuickYoda41]

If we're at Spa 2008, I always questioned Ferrari's decision not to change Massa's tyres. He didn't really have a position to lose IIRC. Of course, if they knew that Raikkonen will bin it, and Hamilton will be penalized, it was the perfect strategy.

[mario]

If we're at Spa 2008, I always questioned Ferrari's decision not to change Massa's tyres. He didn't really have a position to lose IIRC. Of course, if they knew that Raikkonen will bin it, and Hamilton will be penalized, it was the perfect strategy.

Ironically, Ferrari admitted that they were about to bring Kimi into the pits for intermediates on the lap that he crashed because Kimi was losing so much time (especially since fighting with Hamilton meant that both drivers were losing even more time). I guess, though, that the reason why Ferrari didn't bring Massa into the pits was because Nick Heidfeld had switched to inters by that point and was catching Massa at a vast rate of knots - if Ferrari brought Massa in for intermediates by that point, the time it would have taken to complete the stop would have given Heidfeld the position.
It's actually somewhat weird to think that, were F1 using the start-finish line for the GT races instead of just after the bus stop, it'd probably have been Heidfeld who'd have been awarded the victory once Hamilton's penalty was taken into account, such was the rate at which he was catching Massa...

[JeremyMcClean]

I thought Bruno Senna's strategist at the Korean (?) GP in 2011 was stupid. He was in the points, but pitted with a handful of laps to go for hards. Stupid and idiotic! Not sure if that's what Senna Jr wanted or if he was forced to, but I thought Bruno had the pace to score points that day.

Wasn't he falling afoul of the "each set per GP" rule and had to pit, lest he would be facing a DSQ?

Precisely. They left the hards at the last moment. Idiotic.

[AdrianSutil]

I thought Bruno Senna's strategist at the Korean (?) GP in 2011 was stupid. He was in the points, but pitted with a handful of laps to go for hards. Stupid and idiotic! Not sure if that's what Senna Jr wanted or if he was forced to, but I thought Bruno had the pace to score points that day.

Wasn't he falling afoul of the "each set per GP" rule and had to pit, lest he would be facing a DSQ?

Precisely. They left the hards at the last moment. Idiotic.

Yes but, if they had used the hard set earlier like everyone else, Senna wouldn't have been running in the points anyway. It was a bold strategy that nearly paid off.

[ibsey]

How about Hakkinen & Mclaren’s poor strategy calls during the 1999 European GP @ Nurburgring. I remember that Ron Dennis himself made the call for wet tyres, that ultimately cost Hakkinen the race (& so nearly the 1999 Championship with it). What’s more Hakkinen stayed out on wets on a dry track for a good few laps afterwards trying to make it work…& IIRC even got passed by a Minardi driver!!!

Then even when Hakkinen was put on the correct dry tyres, he seemed to give up in the middle of the race…lapping 3 seconds slower than he had done previously (despite it being bone dry)…that was until the chance came to score a point by overtaking Marc Gene in the Minardi

[Aerond]

I can remember one by Ayrton, incredibly brilliant: 1993 Brazil. He stopped before everybody else when it started to rain, knowing that in that time of the year (Later March or April), rain in Sao Paulo means STORM, then, knowing that the heat of Sao Paulo would dry the track faster than usual, he switched back to Slicks when the track was yet wet. His hands with slick tyres over a wet track did the rest to beat the "invincible" Williams.

[Bleu]

How about Hakkinen & Mclaren’s poor strategy calls during the 1999 European GP @ Nurburgring. I remember that Ron Dennis himself made the call for wet tyres, that ultimately cost Hakkinen the race (& so nearly the 1999 Championship with it). What’s more Hakkinen stayed out on wets on a dry track for a good few laps afterwards trying to make it work…& IIRC even got passed by a Minardi driver!!!

Then even when Hakkinen was put on the correct dry tyres, he seemed to give up in the middle of the race…lapping 3 seconds slower than he had done previously (despite it being bone dry)…that was until the chance came to score a point by overtaking Marc Gene in the Minardi

I remember that. However, McLaren also made a good recovery strategy call - after putting back dry-weather tyres on lap 24/66 he was fuelled to the end, so he didn't need to pit again.

Damon Hill in Monaco 1995 was a bad one - two-stop strategy on a circuit where one-stop was more efficient than anywhere else.

[mario]

I can remember one by Ayrton, incredibly brilliant: 1993 Brazil. He stopped before everybody else when it started to rain, knowing that in that time of the year (Later March or April), rain in Sao Paulo means STORM, then, knowing that the heat of Sao Paulo would dry the track faster than usual, he switched back to Slicks when the track was yet wet. His hands with slick tyres over a wet track did the rest to beat the "invincible" Williams.

Surely that is the total opposite of what this thread is about - that strategic call by Ayrton worked for him, not against him...

[ibsey]

To add to Nurburgring 1999 race, it seems Mclaren & DC went to the opposite way of Hakkinen's strategy by keeping DC out on slicks in wet conditions...DC made a habit of doing that...Brazil 2001 & Sliverstone 1998 (inters instead of wets).

Sliverstone 2002 was a classic race for this subject since IIRC Michelin didn't have any decent intermediate tyres. So all the Michelin shod teams kept having to pit to try to find a suitable tyre for the ever changing conditions. I think Michelin excuse for it's poor intermediate tyres was something like 'we were contretrating on dry tyre performance to the detrement of out inters'. However I think Martin Brundle had said in his experience from sportscar racing Michelin tyres had always been poor in semi-wet races.

JV at Canada perhaps is another example of reject strategy at its finest. IIRC he was running around 3rd or 4th in that race & came into the pits just as it started to rain. Unfortnately for him the team opted to send him back out on slicks rather than take a gamble. Normally this scenario could just be put down as a gamble that didn't pay off. However what makes this particular incident special as soon as JV realised his team were putting slicks back on the car, he immediately knew it was the wrong decison & started bang his hands on the steering wheel, as if to say to the team "what the hell are you doing?".

Needless to say, the very next lap JV had to come back for a set of wet tyres which wreck his race. I don't know what BAR were thinking at that time, maybe trying to play it safe but they got it very wrong indeed.

[ibsey]

Nelson Piquet was the only driver to opt for slicks at the start of the 1988 German Gp at Hockenhiem, & promptly crashed out at the 2nd corner of the race.
Normally I wouldn't consider 'gambling' on slicks, as a 'reject' strategy. However what makes this instance particularly rejectful was the track was still fairly wet at the start of the race. Therefore Nelson's tyre choice, was frankly rather silly. To give an idea of how wet it still was at the start of the race, all the other drivers didn't even start to think about slick tyres until lap 11, therefore when around 25% of the race distance had been completed. IIRC the 1st pitstops happen a lap or so later.

Also remember this would have been the old Hockenhiem circuit, so the cars would have had minimual downforce on (thus struggling to get temperature into slicks on a wet track & allow the tyres to 'cut through' the water, rather than ride on top of it). Also the tall pine trees which ran alongside the track would mean that water would be slow to clear from the track, also the track being long, so the cars wouldn't pass over the same bit of track as often, so couldn't clear a dry line as easily, etc.

When you consider all of the above, it does make Nelson's strategy very suspect indeed.

[Wizzie]

Jos Verstappen did a similar thing at the 1996 Monaco Grand Prix before proceeding to throw it into the wall at Ste Devote (Although, from memory, I think he was helped into the barrier) but, arguably, the worst strategy call of the day was Sauber putting Frentzen on wets when he pitted for a new front wing having just lost his patience with Eddie Irvine. Considering the fact that by the time everyone did pit for slicks and realised that they had waited about 10 laps too long, one has to wonder if Frentzen could have won the race had he not been overruled by the Sauber team at that stop.

[ibsey]

Jos Verstappen did a similar thing at the 1996 Monaco Grand Prix before proceeding to throw it into the wall at Ste Devote (Although, from memory, I think he was helped into the barrier) but, arguably, the worst strategy call of the day was Sauber putting Frentzen on wets when he pitted for a new front wing having just lost his patience with Eddie Irvine. Considering the fact that by the time everyone did pit for slicks and realised that they had waited about 10 laps too long, one has to wonder if Frentzen could have won the race had he not been overruled by the Sauber team at that stop.

Ah yes, I had completely forgotten about that one, thanks for that Wizzie.

Indeed I remember thinking even when Panis or Damon was the 1st to go onto slicks (can't quite remember who was the first one on slicks now) & went several seconds a lap quicker, the others teams & drivers were still pretty slow to react to that. Also I remember Jean Alesi getting past on track by Damon for the lead, up the hill after St Devote, because he still hadn't pitted for slicks. Bearing in mind how difficult it usually is to past at Monaco, just shows how bad the wet tyres must have been performing in comparison to slicks (suprising considering Jean is usually the first one on slicks in damp conditions, anyway).

Although I didn't know that Frentzen asked for slicks, when the Sauber team over-ruled him. I agree he could have won the race, especially considering the he & the car actually got to the finish of the race. A rare achievement indeed.

[Wizzie]

Jos Verstappen did a similar thing at the 1996 Monaco Grand Prix before proceeding to throw it into the wall at Ste Devote (Although, from memory, I think he was helped into the barrier) but, arguably, the worst strategy call of the day was Sauber putting Frentzen on wets when he pitted for a new front wing having just lost his patience with Eddie Irvine. Considering the fact that by the time everyone did pit for slicks and realised that they had waited about 10 laps too long, one has to wonder if Frentzen could have won the race had he not been overruled by the Sauber team at that stop.

Ah yes, I had completely forgotten about that one, thanks for that Wizzie.

Indeed I remember thinking even when Panis or Damon was the 1st to go onto slicks (can't quite remember who was the first one on slicks now) & went several seconds a lap quicker, the others teams & drivers were still pretty slow to react to that. Also I remember Jean Alesi getting past on track by Damon for the lead, up the hill after St Devote, because he still hadn't pitted for slicks. Bearing in mind how difficult it usually is to past at Monaco, just shows how bad the wet tyres must have been performing in comparison to slicks (suprising considering Jean is usually the first one on slicks in damp conditions, anyway).

Although I didn't know that Frentzen asked for slicks, when the Sauber team over-ruled him. I agree he could have won the race, especially considering the he & the car actually got to the finish of the race. A rare achievement indeed.

Technically speaking, Frentzen didn't make it to the end as the team pulled him in before he started the final lap when they realised it was a pointless exercise leaving him out there.

[AdrianSutil]

The Sauber team did indeed over-rule Frentzen's wish for slicks. Shame really.

[James1978]

On a similar Frentzen and Monaco theme, didn't Williams start both cars on slicks in the wet in 1997? At least they could have split the strategy!!

[inchworm]

Not F1 and very hazy but quite funny... British F3 at Snetterton 2001 - any team starting with both cars on the back row of a sopping wet track could be forgiven for trying starting on slicks, hoping somehow the track would dry, and somehow one of their drivers might hang on to it long enough for the gamble to pay off... Unless one of your drivers is Takuma Sato! I don't think either of them made it passed the first lap...

[ibsey]

On a similar Frentzen and Monaco theme, didn't Williams start both cars on slicks in the wet in 1997? At least they could have split the strategy!!

Yes I agree that was one of the worst strategy calls of all time. One wonders what indications were there just before the start of the race, pointing Williams in that direction?

For instance, Ferrari got the call right. I know M Schumi had one car set up for dry & one car set up for a wet race, but he ultimately choose the correct car. Therefore you have to assume that the correct weather forecast was avaliable to the teams (or at least those who employed weather forecasters). Perhaps its just some teams made better use of the information in front of them?

Personally I think Williams choose the 'slicks' option (in addition to full dry setup), as they were trying to repeat what they had successfully managed to do in 1983. When Keke Rosberg won, he & his teammate Laffite were the only drivers (IIRC) to start the race on slicks & pretty much won the race because of it.

However I believe their were fundamental differences between 1983 & 1997. Firstly in 1983 Williams were one of the only teams still running the normally aspirated engine. Therefore it would be reasonable to expected them to have an advantage over the turbo's since they wouldn't have had to contend with turbo-lag in tricky conditions (making it even riskier for the turbos to run the slicks at the start). Obviously Williams didn't have this same advantage in 1997.

Secondly, pitstops in 1997 seemed to be much quicker than in 1983 & it was less likely that something would go wrong (since teams were more used to them in 1997). Furthermore calling a driver in for a stop was much easier also. So in 1997 Williams should have recognised, unlike 1983, that they were in a better position to start on correct tyres at the start of the race (i.e. wets) & pit if & when it was nesscessary to do so.

Also other factors like Keke was on fire in 1983. Where as in 1997 the drivers were a little more suspect in those tricky conditions (especially JV who even back in 1997, wasn't known for his ability in the wet, due to his prior indycar experience). Also the 1997 Williams seemed to be especially difficult to drive in the wet, it looked like it always had a 'stiffier' suspension setup than others. Perhaps as a result (IIRC) I don't think they ever put in a decent wet performance throughout 1997.

So taking all of the above into account, you have to wonder why Williams didn't opt for the safer option of start on wets (as most of the field did IIRC). Especially given they were fighting for the 1997 championship so show have bagged the safe points first & foremost. Easy to say in hindsight however. Although I just sense perhaps Williams were a little too 'blinded' by trying to re-emluate their 1983 success, that they failed to properly consider the above & therefore the possibility of starting the race on wets & a wet setup in 1997?